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Abstract
This paper provides a proof of the proposed Internet standard Trans-
port Level Security protocol using the Gong–Needham–Yahalom logic. It
is intended as a teaching aid and hopes to show to students: the potency
of a formal method for protocol design; some of the subtleties of authen-
ticating parties on a network where all messages can be intercepted; the
design of what should be a widely accepted standard.
1 Transport Level Security Protocol
This section provides an insight into the workings of the next generation of au-
thentication protocol: the Transport Level Security Protocol version 1.0[DA97],
the successor to the Secure Sockets Layer[FKK95]. To do this, the Gong–
Needham–Yahalom, GNY, logic [GNY90] is introduced which is a formal method
for proving the safety of a cryptographically-based protocol. It is described at
length in appendix A. When working through protocols the relevant rule of
inference will be stated and will refer to those in the appendix.
The Transport Level Security handshake protocol [DA97], TLS, has an un-
known heritage, but it has a great deal of similarity to that described in [DS81].
It is predicated on the existence of readily available public keys: TLS’s pre-
decessor made use of X.509 certificates, see [CCI88], issued by a Certification
Authority, CA, an example of which is Thawte[THA99]. A discussion of the
limitations of certificate technology can be found in Ro¨scheisen’s on–line paper
[Ros95].
TLS has three sub–protocols:
• Server anonymous
• Server named, client anonymous
• Server named, client named
These differ by who is required to send their X.509 certificates, the key
exchange protocol is different only when the client is named and thus has a
public–key that can be used. The messages are shown in figure 1 sent during a
run of the protocol are more or less the same for all sub–protocols. As can be
seen, no key issuing server is needed.
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The TLS is a more complicated protocol than the Kerberos which is de-
scribed in the appendix §A.3 , before looking at TLS’s protocol proof, it might
be best to examine Kerberos’s. Also, there are some more examples of other
authentication protocols being investigated and found lacking[Low96].
A protocol proof has three stages:
• Message Analysis
• Pre–conditions Analysis
• Belief deductions for each message
Message analysis involves formalizing the content of messages so that they
contain just keys and identifiers. Pre–conditions analysis formalizes what the
parties to the protocol assume about the state of keys before undertaking the
protocol run. Belief deductions analyzes how each party can deduce new beliefs
when it receives a new message.
2 Messages for the Named Server Protocol
There are six message exchanges. There is a provision for more, to settle which
cryptographic implementations to use and for the client to provide a certificate,
but this is the basic protocol for a named server to an anonymous client.
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Figure 1: TLS protocol: Messages
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Messages
A→ B : (NA, TA) (M1)
B → A : (NB , TB) (M2)
B → A : {+KB, 〈B〉, 〈C〉}−KC (M3)
A→ B : {N ′A}+KB (M4)
B → A : {H(KAB, AB5, (M1,M2,M3,M4))}KAB (M5)
A→ B : {H(KAB, AB6, (M1,M2,M3,M4))}KAB (M6)
where
KAB = F ((NA, TA, NB, TB), N
′
A)
and, the behaviour of the public and private keys is:
{{X}−K}+K = X
{{X}+K}−K = X
and
AB5 , “server finished” , AB6 , “client finished”
The messages can be summarized as follows:
M1 A sends a timestamp and a nonce to B.
M2 B sends another timestamp and another nonce to A.
M3 B sends its certificate signed by the certification authority; it contains +KB,
B’s public–key.
M4 A returns the “pre–master secret” N
′
A encrypted under +KB.
M5 B sends a hash of the session key, a tag indicating the protocol stage AB5
1
and all preceding messages exchanged to A.
M6 A sends a hash of the session key, a tag indicating the protocol stage AB6
key and all preceding messages to B.
3 Pre–Conditions
Certificates
1. Some Expectations
A expects to use C as the certification authority and expects to use B, so
A ∋ 〈C〉 A ∋ 〈B〉 (1i)
1Actually all stages of the protocol are marked with a stage identifier, but it is not necessary
to consider all of them.
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2. Using Them
The role of the unseen certification authority, C, is pivotal. Even though
C has used the private key −KC to create the certificate, this key is not
used again.
B |≡ A |≡
+KC→ C, A |≡
+KC→ C (1ii)
The two parties rely on the public–key being available. A must be able to
get KC :
A ∋ +KC, B |≡ A ∋ +KC (1iii)
3. Trusting in them
The pre–conditions regarding B’s certificate are as follows. A and B both
trust C to deliver the correct identity with the public key.
A |≡ C |⇒ (+KP , 〈P 〉), B |≡ C |⇒ (+KP , 〈P 〉) (1iv)
4. Meaning of the contents
For A the assumption underlying a certificate is that the public–key is the
public–key of the named party.
A |≡ (+KP , 〈P 〉) C |≡
+KP→ P (1v)
And A believes C when C names a key:
A |≡ C |⇒
+KP→ P (1vi)
System Capabilities
1. B believes that A can generate a nonce and keep it secret to pass it on as
the pre–master secret.
B |≡ A |⇒#(X), B |≡ A
X
↔ A (1vii)
2. A and B have both assumed that the other can generate the master secret
if presented with the components.
A |≡ B |⇒ F (X,Y ), B |≡ A |⇒ F (X,Y ) (1viii)
and, of course, they do
B |⇒ F (X,Y ), A |⇒ F (X,Y ) (1ix)
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3. B has a private–key and holds his own certificate.
B ∋ −KB, B ∋ {+KB, 〈B〉, 〈C〉}−KC (1x)
Note that the format of a certificate does includes a statement of the
identity of C. Although not used in this protocol it is an important part
of it since it allows the public–key of C to be checked.
4 Belief Deductions Analysis
1. Messages M1 received by B and M2 received by A
These nonce and timestamp exchanges are important, because they are
used in the generation of the key. The vindication is the appearance of
the time–stamp, which is definitely fresh, and the the rule (F1) freshens
the nonces.
A ∋M1,M2 By (P1)
A ∋ NB, TB, NA, TA
A |≡#(NB)
and
B ∋M1,M2 By (P1)
B ∋ NA, TA, NB, TB
B |≡#(NA)
(2i)
2. Message M3 received by A
A receives the certificate from, presumably, B. By (1ii), (1iii) and (I4), A
now has:
A |≡ C |∼ {+KB, 〈B〉, 〈C〉}−KC
and can decrypt the contents to discover:
C |∼ (+KB, 〈B〉)
By (1iv) and (1v)
A |≡ C |≡
+KB→ B
By (1vi) and (J1)
A |≡
+KB→ B
And of course
A ∋M3 By (P1).
A ∋M4 Because A creates it.
(2ii)
Notice that A does not know that the sender of this message was B.
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3. Message M4 received by B
B gains knowledge of the following:
B ∋M3 Since it sent it
B ∋M4 By (P1)
(2iii)
From which by (I2) where 〈S〉 is N ′A.
B ⊳ N ′A
B ∋ N ′A
This is something of an innovation: N ′A has not been established as a
shared secret by the conventional method of passing it along a channel
secured by a long–term key or comparing it to a pre–stored hash, but it
will be established as a secret by the subsequent correct operation of the
protocol.
Since N ′A came under cover of the public key and it will be later identified
as unique to the sender, it is a shared secret, so by (1vii).
B |≡ A
N
′
A↔ B
B |≡#(N ′A)
Now by (1ix) and (2i)
B ∋ KAB
B |≡#(KAB)
∵ B ∋ NA, NB, TA, TB
B can now construct the response message:
B ∋M1,M2,M3,M4
B ∋ H(KAB, AB5, (M1,M2,M3,M4))
4. Message M5 received by A
A now receives a message from B which can only be understood correctly,
if both A and B have agreed upon KAB.
A performs some pre–calculations:
A ∋ KAB
∵ A ∋ N ′A, NA, NB, TA, TB
A ∋ H(KAB, AB5, (M1,M2,M3,M4))
Because A has been collecting the messages as well (1ix) and holding all
previous messages (2i) and (2ii).
By (I1) A can decrypt the message
A ⊳H(KAB, AB5, (M1,M2,M3,M4))
∴
A |≡H(KAB, AB5, (M1,M2,M3,M4))
 B ∋ H(KAB, AB5, (M1,M2,M3,M4))
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A can now make a series of justified conclusions, by (I3)
A |≡ B ∋ N ′B ,KAB
A |≡ B ∋M1,M2,M3,M4
A |≡ B ∋ NA, TA, NB, TB
A can now validate the identity of the other party:
A |≡ B |∼ (NB, TB)
A |≡ B |≡ A |∼ (NA, TA)
A |≡ B |≡ A
KAB↔ B
A |≡ B |≡#(KAB)
A |≡ B ⊳M1
A |≡ B |∼M2
A |≡ B |∼M3
A |≡ B ⊳M4
(2iv)
It should be clear now why the key KAB is hashed into the hash signature
H(KAB, AB5, (M1,M2,M3,M4)). A hash is only validated by inclusion
of a secret and a nonce, see (I3), the key KAB is both.
5. Message M6 received by B
By a similar argument to that used for A, it is clear:
B |≡ A |∼ N ′A
B |≡ A |≡ B |∼ (NB , TB)
B |≡ A |≡ A
KAB↔ B
B |≡ A |≡#(KAB)
B |≡ A |∼M1
B |≡ A ⊳M2
B |≡ A ⊳M3
B |≡ A |∼M4
(2v)
Since A could only generate this message if in possession of KAB, B can
deduce that A is the party with whom it shares the key and the whole
protocol run is current.
5 Summary: Innovations and Possible Attacks
Summary The Transport Level Security handshake protocol is quite inge-
nious: it lets A send a random message under a public key which is used as an
identifying secret shared by the parties before it has been established as such.
A challenge and response protocol, the challenge is issued in plain–text and the
response returns it as cipher–text, so that the challenger can verify that the
responder knows the shared session key. This protocol is effectively a challenge
and response protocol with the generated session key, which is created from the
secret sent under the public–key.
The protocol is also exemplary in its use of stage identifiers and hash digests.
The stage identifiers change the hash digest between messagesM5 andM6. The
hash digests validate the whole protocol run.
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Attacks The critical point of the protocol is the transmission of the public–
key with which the client should respond with a nonce encrypted under it.
The man-in-the-middle attack is well known here: all that need be done is to
intercept M3 and substitute a bogus certificate. The fraud then hinges upons
the expectations of A, (1i).
1. Impersonate C and B
If A is not expecting to use C or B then the attacker, M , can substitute
a different certificate for another service: D.
2. Impersonate B
If A is not expecting to use B but is expecting a certificate issued by C
then M can create a service D and attempt to have C issue a certificate
for it.
It is quite easy to provide a service that looks like B and appears to be at the
address of B this is rather more difficult with a certification authority because
the public certification scheme proposed in [ITU89] is based upon the following:
• Certification authorities are well–known in that their addresses and public–
keys can be obtained from many sources.
• Certificates contain lists of certification authorities which allow a client to
match known certification authorities to those found in the certificates.
Certification authorities currently do nothing other than provide certificates,
so all a client obtains from a certificate is some accountability. If defrauded the
client can attempt to locate the server who perpetrated the fraud.
Another Useful Feature One of the provisions of TLS is to allow the server
to pass to the client another key to use in place of the certificate key. This may
be necessary for any of the following reasons:
• The client lacks an implementation to encrypt with the server’s public–key.
• The server does not wish to use its public–key.
• Restrictions on key size require that a smaller or larger key must be used.
The client would receive a different public–key but that must be signed under
the certificate key for the client to have any faith in it. If the client had chosen
to use the alternative key because it lacked an implementation, it would still
need to decrypt under the certification authority’s key, it is unlikely that the
client would be able to do this and not make use of the server’s certificate key.
The alternative cryptosystem to system used for certificates is the Diffie–
Hellman public–key system[DH77].
6 Other sub-protocols
The protocol described above was the named server protocol, where the server
must provide a certificate. There are two other sub–protocols.
8
6.1 Anonymous Server
In this variant, the server is anonymous and creates a public and private key
pair to be used to establish the session key. It would usually use the Diffie–
Hellman scheme in this case and would simply send to the client the public key
instead of the certificate. This does not weaken the protocol at all, the client
and the server will be able to mutually authenticate one another, but the server
is unknown to the client and to a certification authority. There is no chain of
accountability that could help to locate a fraudulent server.
6.2 Named Client and Server
This variant provides some accountability to the server of the client’s identity
and it relies upon the client having a certificate. The protocol is the same as the
named server protocol, but the server can request a certificate from the client
prior to the client sending the pre–master secret. If the client has no certificate
it replies by returning no certificates, whereupon the server can take its own
action, which may well be to raise an error and not complete the protocol.
7 Summary
TLS, like its predecessor the Secure Socket Layer, SSL, does provide both parties
with a mutual belief that the shared session key is a fresh secret. It also, like
SSL, can provide the client with some account of the server’s Internet location
and, unlike its predecessor, it does support mutual authentication certificate
exchange. Suffice to say that identities can be securely established—using X.509
certificates—and that a session key can be securely established.
A protocol proof is just a basis for a secure implementation. The software
engineering of the authentication protocol has to be considered. An example
of such a failure to ensure that a software implementation was invulnerable
to attack can be found at [CER98]. The problem with that implementation
was that error messages proved to be too informative allowing a sophisticated
intruder to recover a session key more quickly than by key trial. Lowe’s paper
[Low96] has some other implementation attacks.
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A Appendix: Gong–Needham–Yong Logic
This is only a cursory introduction to this simple proof system, despite stimu-
lating a great deal of research interest it is relatively unchanged.
A.1 Brief History
Authentication protocols had been developed and discussed, in particular the
CCITT X.509 protocol of 1987 [CCI88] was the source for some debate and it
was [BAN90], which proved a weakness existed in it. The protocol was extended
by [GNY90] and it has been adapted and used in other contexts, [ABLP91]. It
may even have been superceded by a calculus that is somewhat less intuitive
[AG98]. It is now used principally to illustrate that there is more to secure
information that just have believing it to be so, for which see [XZX97] and
[Low96].
A.2 The Logic
Notation A.1 (Formulae). Formulae is the name used to refer to a bit–
string. Certain useful operations can be applied to bit strings, which are given
below. X and Y range over formulae; S over formulae that are secrets and K
over formulae that are keys.
(X,Y ) Resulting bit–string is a concatenation of two formalue.
{X}K and {X}
−1
K
Results are bit–strings are X encrypted and decrypted un-
der a symmetric cryptosystem with key K, respectively.
{X}+K and {X}−K Bit–string results are X encrypted under the public key
and under the private key, respectively, of an asymmetric cryptosystem
with public key +K and and private key −K.
H(X) Result is X after having been subjected to a one-way function.
F (X1, X2, · · · , Xn) Bit–string is the result after applying the many-to-one func-
tion F , which is an invertible and computationally feasible in both direc-
tions, to all of X1, X2, · · · , Xn.
Notation A.2 (Statements). Statements make an assertion about a property
of a formula. P and Q denote principals—clients, agents and servers: X is a
message; K a key; S a secret.
P ⊳ X P is told the message X .
P ∋ X P holds or can obtain the message X .
P |∼ X P has once conveyed X .
P |≡ X P believes the message X .
P |≡#(X) P believes that X is a fresh statement, not seen before in this run
of the protocol. X is often known as a nonce. (Note freshness is a belief
relative to a principal).
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P |≡φ (X) P believes that X is recognizable: P is able to decode X it has a
recognizable transfer syntax. (Same note as above).
P |≡ P
S
↔ Q P believes it shares the secret S with Q.
P |≡
+K
→ Q P believes that +K is the public key of Q.
P |≡ Q |⇒ C P believes that Q has jurisdiction over C.
P |≡ Q |⇒ Q |≡ ∗ P believes that Q has jurisdiction over all of beliefs held by
P .
X  C X is a message expressing the statement C.
C1, C2 Conjunction of two statements: C1 and C2.
∗X The message did not originate from its current location.
Remark A.1 (Epochs). Time is divided into two epoch: past and present.
The present is the run of a protocol. The past is all other runs of protocols.
P |≡ X , if a pre–condition, is valid for all of the present. Beliefs held in the
past are not necessarily carried forward to the present.
Remark A.2 (Encryption). There are some assumptions about encrypted
messages:
1. Messages are assumed to be encrypted as a whole.
2. For recipients: each encrypted message contains enough redundancy to
allow the recipient to determine, on decryption, that the right key has
been used to do so.
3. For senders: each message contains enough information to allow senders
to detect and ignore messages that originated from them.
Also,
1. The key cannot be deduced from the encrypted message.
2. The message can be understood by only those who possess the correct
decrypting key.
The logic of authentication is a set of inference rules. The premisses are
stated above the deductive line, the conclusion below.
Rule A.1 (Universal–Local). This is an axiom from modal logic.
C1
C2
⇒
P |≡ C1
P |≡ C2
(Localize)
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Rule A.2 (Being–Told). The rules about the “being-told” operator ⊳.
P ⊳ ∗X
P ⊳ X
(T1)
(T1) says that if one is in receipt of a message that did originate from elsewhere,
one is still aware of it.
P ⊳ (X,Y )
P ⊳ X
(T2)
(T2) says that if one is in receipt of a composite message one is in receipt of
each part of it.
P ⊳ {X}K, P ∋ K
P ⊳ X
(T3)
(T3) is simple one must possess the right key to understand encrypted messages.
P ⊳ {X}+K, P ∋ −K
P ⊳ X
(T4)
(T4) is the same statement for public–key systems, decrypting with the private
key.
P ⊳ F (X,Y ), P ∋ X
P ⊳ Y
(T5)
(T5) is the same statement for a combination function.
{{X}−K}+K = X,P ⊳ {X}−K, P ∋ +K
P ⊳ X
(T6)
(T6) is the same statement for public–key systems, but decrypting with the pub-
lic key. Note with this rule, the requirement that encryption with a public–key
and then with the private–key yields the original message. Not all asymmetric
cryptosystems have this property.
Rule A.3 (Possession). Rules for the ∋ operator:
P ⊳ X
P ∋ X
(P1)
(P1) states that one can possess what one is told.
P ∋ X,P ∋ Y
P ∋ (X,Y ), P ∋ F (X,Y )
(P2)
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(P2) states that if in possession of two messages one can create a concatenation
and apply a function to them.
P ∋ (X,Y )
P ∋ X
(P3)
(P3) possession of a composite yields possession of the components.
P ∋ X
P ∋ H(X)
(P4)
(P4) possession of a message allows the hash of it to be generated.
P ∋ F (X,Y ), P ∋ X
P ∋ Y
(P5)
(P5) for the combination function F (), given X , Y can be determined.
P ∋ K,P ∋ X
P ∋ {X}K, P ∋ {X}
−1
K
(P6)
(P6) one can encrypte and decrypt with key and message.
P ∋ +K,P ∋ X
P ∋ {X}+K
(P7)
(P7) encryption under public–key.
P ∋ −K,P ∋ X
P ∋ {X}−K
(P8)
(P8) encryption under private–key.
Rule A.4 (Freshness). These rules specify what can be deduced from fresh
messages.
P |≡#(X)
P |≡#(X,Y ), P |≡#(F (X))
(F1)
P |≡#(X), P ∋ K
P |≡#({X}K), P |≡#
(
{X}−1
K
) (F2)
P |≡#(X), P ∋ +K
P |≡#({X}+K)
(F3)
P |≡#(X), P ∋ −K
P |≡#({X}−K)
(F4)
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P |≡#(+K)
P |≡#(−K)
(F5)
P |≡#(−K)
P |≡#(+K)
(F6)
P |≡φ (X), P |≡#(K), P ∋ K
P |≡#({X}K), P |≡#
(
{X}−1
K
) (F7)
P |≡φ (X), P |≡#(+K), P ∋ +K
P |≡#({X}+K)
(F8)
P |≡φ (X), P |≡#(−K), P ∋ −K
P |≡#({X}−K)
(F9)
P |≡#(X), P ∋ X
P |≡#(H(X))
(F10)
P |≡#(H(X)), P ∋ H(X)
P |≡#(X)
(F11)
Rule A.5 (Recognizability). When one can claim a formula is recognizable.
P |≡φ (X)
P |≡φ (X,Y ), P |≡ F (X)
(R1)
P |≡φ (X), P ∋ K
P |≡φ ({X}K), P |≡φ
(
{X}−1
K
) (R2)
P |≡φ (X), P ∋ +K
P |≡φ ({X}+K)
(R3)
P |≡φ (X), P ∋ −K
P |≡φ ({X}−K)
(R4)
P |≡φ (X), P ∋ X
P |≡φ (H(X))
(R5)
P ∋ H(K)
P |≡φ (X)
(R6)
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Rule A.6 (Message Interpretation). A secret S used for identification is
denoted 〈S〉—this is to allow it to be distinguished from other secrets that
might be in the message.
P ⊳ ∗{X}K, P ∋ K,P |≡ P
K
↔ Q,P |≡φ (X), P |≡#(X,K)
P |≡ Q |∼ X,P |≡ Q |∼ {X}K , P |≡ Q ∋ K
(I1)
This specifies the flow of beliefs on receipt of an encrypted message under a
shared–key cryptosystem. Notice that P |≡#(X,K), either the key is fresh or
the message is fresh. Usually the message is freshened by adding a nonce (or
timestamp).
P ⊳ ∗{X, 〈S〉}+K ,
P ∋ (−K,S),
P |≡
+K
→ P,
P |≡ P
S
↔ Q,
P |≡ φ (X,S),
P |≡ #(X,S,+K)
P |≡ Q |∼ (X, 〈S〉),
P |≡ Q |∼ {X, 〈S〉}+K ,
P |≡ Q ∋ +K
(I2)
Message sent encrypted under a public–key. Normally such messages are anony-
mous, since anyone can use the public–key, but an identifying secret S is passed.
P ⊳ ∗H(X, 〈S〉), P ∋ (X,S), P |≡ P
S
↔ Q,P |≡#(X,S)
P |≡ Q |∼ (X, 〈S〉), P |≡ Q |∼ H(X, 〈S〉)
(I3)
Passing a hashed message.
P ⊳ {X}−K , P ∋ +K,P |≡
+K
→ Q,P |≡φ (X)
P |≡ Q |∼ X,P |≡ Q |∼ {X}−K
(I4)
Passing a message encrypted under a private–key does not require an identifying
secret.
P ⊳ {X}−K, P ∋ +K,P |≡
+K
→ Q,P |≡φ (X), P |≡#(X,+K)
P |≡ Q ∋ (−K,X)
(I5)
P |≡ Q |∼ X,P |≡#(X)
P |≡ Q ∋ X
(I6)
P |≡ Q |∼ (X,Y )
P |≡ Q |∼ X
(I7)
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Rule A.7 (Jurisdiction). Rules governing the meaning of jurisdiction.
P |≡ Q |⇒ C,P |≡ Q |≡ C
P |≡ C
(J1)
P |≡ Q |⇒ Q |≡ ∗, P |≡ Q |∼ (X  C), P |≡#(X)
P |≡ Q |≡ C
(J2)
P |≡ Q |⇒ Q |≡ ∗, P |≡ Q |≡ Q |≡ C
P |≡ Q |≡ C
(J3)
Definition A.1 (Goals of Authentication). For an authentication there are
a number of possible goals:
1. Assurance: to assure another principal that a message has been received.
P |≡ Q ⊳ X .
2. Exchanging secrets: to send to another principal a secret:
P |≡ P
S
↔ Q, Q |≡ P
S
↔ Q
3. Exchanging secrets: to send to another principal a secret and be assured
of it:
P |≡ Q |≡ P
S
↔ Q, Q |≡ P |≡ P
S
↔ Q
A.3 Example: The Kerberos Protocol
As an illustration of the use of the BAN logic, the Kerberos[NT94] protocol
will be analyzed. This protocol is supported within the emerging Transport
Level Security specification. It is designed to establish a session key between
two principals given a trusted key server.
A
S
B
1
2
3
4
Figure 2: Kerberos Protocol: Messages
Referring to figure 2, the protocol uses three messages to authenticate the
sender and the fourth for mutual authentication of the receiver to the sender.
The messages appear in order below:
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A→ S : (A,B) (M1)
S → A : {TS, L,KAB, B, {TS, L,KAB, A}KBS}KAS (M2)
A→ B : {TS, L,KAB, A}KBS , {A, TA}KAB (M3)
B → A : {TA + 1}KAB (M4)
M1 A indicates that it wants a session key with B by sending two identifiers to
S.
M2 S returns a message that is encrypted under for A only, it contains a times-
tamp, a session key, a restatement of the target for which it can be used
and, the ingenious part, an encrypted message for B.
M3 A sends the encrypted part on to B, which contains the timestamp, the
session key and the other party to the session key. As well as that, A
sends a challenge, encrypted under the session key.
M4 B responds to the challenge by sending back the timestamp with a pre-
determined calculation applied to it.
The timestamps TS and TA have a lifetime L. Effectively, these act as nonces,
so they shall be named as such: NS andNA. There are some preconditions about
key distributions:
A |≡ A
KAS↔ S, B |≡ B
KBS↔ S (3i)
S |≡ A
KAS↔ S, S |≡ B
KBS↔ S (3ii)
S |≡ A
KAB↔ B (3iii)
They all hold long–term keys with each S and vice–versa.
A ∋ KAS, B ∋ KBS (4i)
S ∋ KAS , S ∋ KBS (4ii)
There also some preconditions on jurisdiction and nonces:
A |≡ (S |⇒ A
KAB↔ B), B |≡ (S |⇒ A
KAB↔ B) (5i)
A |≡#(NS), B |≡#(NS), B |≡#(NA) (5ii)
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Finally, the protocol can be analyzed: (M1) establishes no new beliefs, but
with (M2), the following are established:
M2 ,{(X,Y )}KAS
X ,NS , (A
KAB↔ B)
Y ,{NS, (A
KAB↔ B)}KBS
⇒A |≡ S |∼ (X,Y )
By initial key distribution, (T3) and (I1)
From X ⇒A ⊳ (NS , (A
KAB↔ B))
By (T3)
⇒A |≡#
(
A
KAB↔ B
)
By (F1)
⇒A |≡ A
KAB↔ B,A ∋ KAB
By pre–conditions and (J1)
B on receipt of (M3) can establish the following:
M3 , (X,Y )
where
X , {NS , (A
KAB↔ B)}KBS
Y , {NA}KAB
From X
⇒B |≡ S |∼ X
By initial key distribution and (I1)
⇒B ⊳ (NS , (A
KAB↔ B)
By (T3)
⇒B |≡#
(
A
KAB↔ B
)
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By (F1)
⇒B |≡ A
KAB↔ B,A ∋ KAB
By (T1) and jurisdiction pre–conditions
From Y ⇒B |≡ A |∼ NA
By (I1)
⇒B |≡ A |≡ A
KAB↔ B,B |≡ A ∋ KAB
By (I1)
A on receipt of (M4) can establish the following:
M4 , {NA}KAB
where
⇒A ⊳ NA
By (I1)
⇒A |≡ B |≡ A
KAB↔ B,A |≡ B ∋ KAB
By (F1) and (I1)
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